Asia Society Switzerland hosted an ‘Oxford Debate’ to discuss the motion “The next US administration must reassure China, not just deter it.” Arguing in favor of the motion during the hour-long virtual event on 17 September were the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Rorry Daniels and Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. Arguing against the motion were Asia Society TOY Senior Fellow James Crabtree and Jason Hsu, former Taiwanese legislator and Mason fellow at Harvard Kennedy School. Nico Luchsinger, executive director at Asia Society Switzerland, acted as moderator.
Daniels opened the debate by arguing that reassurance is an essential component of an effective US policy on China, defining reassurance as “a shared conviction that the two largest economies in the world – economies that are incredibly interdependent – have more to gain by cooperating and collaborating on shared problems and managing differences through dialog than through force, coercion or conflict.”
Adding force to this proposition is that this is also the relationship that most other countries in the region want between the US and China, so they can make choices independently of a strategic competition between the two superpowers.
Moreover, reassurance does not mean capitulation to China, so that it feels free to prioritize its interests over the West’s; rather, it is a powerful tool for diplomacy that can facilitate meaningful communication and engagement.
As such, it is essential for a reassurance strategy to define a peaceful coexistence between the US and China, where problems are negotiated rather than solved by conflict or forced projection; not least because the stakes are incredibly high for the global economy and for global peace and prosperity, including how we manage the clean-energy transition.
While accepting that a pure deterrence strategy is not ideal, Crabtree began the argument for greater deterrence by pointing out that providing greater reassurance to China is particularly difficult today because trust between the two powers is very low. This is because, on issues such as Taiwan, China does not believe that the US policy is what it says it is; hence reassurance is not effective.
Allied to this – and the core argument against the motion – is that China “is not really seeking reassurance.” It feels insecure in its own neighborhood and does not see the rules-based international order – the status quo – as legitimate. For these reasons, it seeks greater strategic space within its own region, and potentially beyond. History shows that reassuring autocracies in this scenario is not likely to succeed (most recently, it has not succeeded for Vladimir Putin, for example), so the next US administration should focus predominantly on deterrence to achieve its aims.
Sun responded to this view by making two points. First, while reassurance is difficult, that does not mean it cannot or should not be done; diplomacy is an art. Second, it is simplistic to say that China does not want to be reassured, because it depends on the issue. On issues such as Taiwan, regional security architecture, and global order more broadly, China is looking for reassurance. This means diplomatic negotiation – a bargaining process – is needed.
Ultimately, all geo-political policies are a mix of reassurance (albeit confidential) and deterrence: both are aimed at preventing war and managing the relationship. Given the conflicting interests and world visions of the two countries, any US strategy to deal with China must come from a position of strength. This means deterrence must be in the mix, but the problem with a strategy of pure deterrence is that it cultivates an arms race and, as China will not be deterred forever, it will only add to the momentum of military modernization and nuclear buildup.
A strategy of pure deterrence is also a self-fulfilling prophecy: as China responds in kind, the relationship will become even more adversarial, and the two countries will be locked in an escalatory downward spiral without an exit.
Moreover, deterrence without reassurance will mean losing the opportunity to shape China’s behavior and strategy. If China believes there is new room to coexist with the US, its desire to challenge it will be significantly reduced.
Reassurance will not address China’s military buildup or reduce the threat of an invasion. Only strong deterrence, including US support for Taiwan’s defense capabilities, can prevent China from taking more aggressive military steps.
Hsu drew on precedent in reply to this proposition, arguing that history has shown that peace is maintained through strength, not “appeasement,” and that the US military presence in the Indo-Pacific has been a cornerstone of regional stability for decades, preventing conflicts and ensuring freedom of navigation in international waters.
Without strong deterrence, he insisted, reassurance becomes a hollow gesture; it is only when China perceives that its aggressive actions will have tangible costs that “meaningful dialog” can take place on issues such as climate change, trade, and Taiwan.
For this reason, any diplomatic efforts or reassurances should be backed by strong deterrence mechanisms to ensure China takes US concerns seriously.
Hsu cited China’s track record on global collaboration as further evidence of this view as it shows that it tends to pursue its own interests rather than global public goods unless pressured. (For example, China’s promises on climate change have often lagged behind its actions, such as its continued investments in coal plants, both domestically and abroad.)
As someone from Taiwan, he cited his country as the primary example of credible deterrence preventing rather than escalating conflict (whereas weak deterrence often invites aggression as it leaves room for miscalculation). He concluded: “Reassurance will not address China’s military buildup or reduce the threat of an invasion. Only strong deterrence, including US support for Taiwan’s defense capabilities, can prevent China from taking more aggressive military steps. A credible deterrent posture clearly communicated is more likely to prevent misinterpretation of US intentions.”
“The next US administration should therefore articulate a clear and coherent China policy that integrates both deterrence and reassurance.”
With each side having heard the other’s arguments, it was clear that both agreed that deterrence and reassurance are not mutually exclusive – they can, and should be, complementary to each other because deterrence sets the boundaries within which diplomacy can effectively operate.
In terms of strategy, this means reaffirming alliances, promoting multilateralism, and ensuring that both China and the international community understand US strategic goals. The next US administration should therefore articulate a clear and coherent China policy that integrates both deterrence and reassurance.
There was an interesting conclusion to the debate. The Oxford Debate series typically features live polls of audience views on the motion being debated, taken before and after the debate. The final vote showed that the number of “don’t knows” had decreased significantly – by 10% – but both sides had gained votes. Could this be a pointer for US policy on China?
Watch the full debate here.
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