In his book The Changing World Order, former hedge fund manager Ray Dalio argues that we are witnessing the end of one of the big cycles in history, and that a new world order will emerge from a drastic restructuring of debt and the reconfiguring of the global system.
Dalio may go too far, but the center of economic gravity is moving east, and the US is forfeiting its leadership in some spheres. The strength of China and a reassertive Russia requires careful management by the US and Europe.
The upheaval has given many senior executives serious strategic problems. To cope, it is important to adopt new frameworks to understand the situation, and adjust strategies to prioritize a stakeholder approach and build resilience. But what does the optimal framework look like?
Frameworks to understand the world
Over the years, scholars, journalists, and academics have produced easy-to-remember phrases to describe reality, which can help with what Stanford’s David Baron calls nonmarket strategy. Baron’s essential idea, developed in his landmark 1992 textbook Business and its Environment, is that sustained business success depends on looking beyond simplistic analyses of markets and understanding the environment in all its complexity.
A quick review of some commonly used frameworks indicates how the business context has changed. Among the first was the neutral PEST framework, created by Harvard professor Francis Aguilar in 1967 to encourage business leaders to look at political, economic, social, and technological factors. Legal and environmental factors were added later to complete the PESTLE concept.
In 1985, professors Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus began describing the world as volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, or VUCA. At the time, Bill Clinton was US President, Mikhail Gorbachev became Chairman of the Soviet Communist Party, Spain and Portugal had just entered the European Union, and Deng Xiaoping was beginning work on building China into an economic powerhouse. VUCA became a common theme in business schools and corporate boardrooms. The futurist Jamais Cascio upped the stakes three decades later, introducing BANI: an increasingly chaotic context that was brittle, anxious, non-linear, and incomprehensible.
Introducing a PLUTO world
The emerging world order of 2025 calls for new concepts. Some of my colleagues at IESE have coined the term PLUTO to describe a situation that is polarized, liquid, unilateral, tense, and omnirelational. With PLUTO, we signal that it’s a different world, and one which can sometimes feel like a different planet.
Polarization refers to how divided the political scene is in so many countries. While Donald Trump scored a sweeping victory in the electoral college votes in November 2024, his lead over Kamala Harris in the popular vote was only 1.5%, and almost as many people chose not to vote as voted for the two candidates combined. A similar situation exists in many other democracies, including Germany, Spain, the UK, Chile, Argentina, and Turkey.
Liquid means that things are changing fast. The Trump administration upended 60 years of US trade policy in just a few months, sometimes announcing and reversing decisions within days. Traditional alliances are quickly unraveled, and former enemies are approached. This sense of liquidity is felt beyond politics. The race to develop generative artificial intelligence and the battle over which companies and countries will take the lead is happening at breakneck speed.
Unilateralism is replacing multilateralism in the US, China, and Russia. The Trump administration, like that of George W Bush, rejects multilateral agreements and prefers to go its own way. Even if the American electorate chooses to limit this administration in mid-term elections or elects a very different leader in 2028, the trust the world has placed in the US as the principal leader in cooperation and free trade will take years to recover. Regardless of what happens in Ukraine, Russia will pursue its policies unilaterally, and there is no easy answer to what happens post-Vladimir Putin. China’s development policy has long been centered on economic and technological self-sufficiency, and it has resisted international pressure for political reform.
Unilateralism makes the situation tense, although the strains between China and the US did not start with Trump. Eight years ago, former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government Graham Allison wrote about what he described as the Thucydides Trap, which is when a nation’s ascent threatens the position of the dominant power and causes conflict (Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?).